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"The Social world of the future will require the intelligent guidance 
of turbulence, rapid change and complexity if it is to avoid opression 
and want ... [it] will require ... institutions ... designed around 
collaboration and reason rather than coercion and fear.' 
Planning theory and practice like other 
disciplines, have passed through several 
paradigmatic shifts this century; on ac­
count of its close sociopolitical and cul­
tural ties, changes in planning have been 
associated in the USA with social turbu­
lence. Recent experiences there with the 
problems associated with planning in a 
pluralistic, divided public decision mak­
ing arena hold potential lessons for 
South African planning as it moves into 
a similarly turbulent period. 
This article evaluates and explores the 
contribution which the styles of media­
tion developed in environmental pro­
blem resolution in the USA, can make 
under these circumstances. After review­
ing the need in the Republic for a new 
approach which recognises value biases 
and conflicts of interest, to replace the 
outmoded approach currently in use, a 
model mediatory approach is defined 
and described before being tested 
against eight case studies including 
regi�nal planning, public utilities, 
negotiated investment strategies, and ur­
ban planning examples. 
1. INTRODUCTION
In a recent article De Oliviera (1986:219)
forcefully argued that South African
planning has remained oblivious to
changes in both procedural planning
theory, and to "changing soc.ial condi­
tions" ... [it] "has been very much a
legislative activity related to the physi­
cal control of land use development and
[is] devoid of the reformist and social
concerns" which characterised the for­
mative period of the history of the
profession. He proceeded to evaluate
several models of mediatory planning
Bolan (1974: 30) 
Fundamental criteria on which the 
model is based are then related to the 
case studies showing a strong correlation 
in most regards. General conclusions are 
drawn together with a favourable ap­
praisal of the applicability of this form 
of mediation as a planning approach in 
South Africa. 
Beplanningsteorie en -praktyk, soos 
and er dissiplines, het gedurende die loop 
van die eeu 'n aantal veranderings on­
dergaan: weens die sterk sosio-politiese 
en kulturele bande is verandering in die 
in proposing an alternative style of 
planning based on Roweis 's concept of 
"Mediation". 
The aim of this paper is not to criticise 
De Oliviera's proposal, since this has 
already been undertaken (Boden, 
1986), but rather to examine more fully 
than he chose to, the potential of one of 
the other mediatory styles which he re­
jected (De Oliviera, op. cit:220-227). 
This style is what De Oliviera calls en­
vironmental mediation, as do Susskind 
and Ozawa (1984). 
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VSA aan sosiale onrustigheid gekoppel. 
Onlangse ondervindinge in die VSA met 
betrekking tot probleme aangaande 
beplanning in 'n pluralistiese en ver­
deelde openbare besluitnemingsarena 
hou lesse in vir beplanning in Suid­
Afrika waar ons in 'n soortgelyke on­
stuimige periode inbeweeg. 
In hierdie artikel word daar gekyk na die 
verskillende bemiddelingstyle wat in die 
VSA toegepas word om omgewingspro­
bleme op te los en die bydrae wat hulle 
kan maak onder omstandighede waar 
verskillende waardes en konjlikte van 
belange heers. Hierna word 'n nuwe 
benadering wat belangekonflikte erken 
en wat op 'n modelbemiddelingstyl 
geskoei is, voorgestel. Hierdie model is
gedefineer en beskryf en teen agt gevalle 
studies op verskillende terreine o.a. 
stads- en streekbeplanningsvoorbeelde 
getoets. 
Onderliggende kriteria wat 'n sterk kor­
relasie in meeste gevalle aandui, is
getoets. Oor die algemeen blyk dit dat 
hierdie vorm van bemiddeling we/ in 
Suid-Afrika van toepassing is. 
The argument proceeds from a short 
review·of the influence values and con­
text exert over the collapse of old 
paradigms and the emergence of new 
planning concepts, to discuss the im­
portance of finding a more effective, yet 
feasible modus operandi. After discus­
sing the differences between mediation 
and negotiation, the characteristics of 
the mediatory model utilized in en­
vironmental conflicts in the USA are 
identified, and the theoretical strengths 
and weaknesses are summarized, fol-
lowed by a series of case studies deliber­
ately selected to cover a wide range of 
problems. 
In conclusion the generic advantages 
and disadvantages of the approach pre­
ceed the evaluation of its potential for 
application in the Republic. 
2. THE DRIVE TOWARDS NEW
PARADIGMS IN PLANNING
Essentially there are several reasons for
re-examining the philosophy, proce­
dures and techniques on which plan­
ners depend in approaching the perfor­
mance of their professional duties. As 
Kuhn (1970) has shown in the case of 
Science, and Smith (1974) has shown in 
relation to the Fine Arts and our per­
ception of cities, disciplinary para­
digms are seldom static: the examplar
or the "classical" ideal towards which
we strive is either being reinforced as it
gains widespread acceptance, or being
undermined by iconoclasts. Yet Kuhn is
emphatic that paradigms rule until they
are replaced by equally comprehensive
alternatives - models which include
ideas, techniques and model solutions
that work better than their predeces­
sors.
Since the 1950s the USA has become 
the dominant source of planning the­
ory: during this period, repeated at­
tempts have been made to dethrone the 
comprehensive, rational planning para­
digm, either so as to replace it with 
other more fragmented procedures -
incrementalist, transactive, advocacy, 
or mixed scanning in nature - or be­
cause it is ideologically unpalatable. 
Thus Fainstein and Fainstein (1971) 
criticize the artificiality of the "scien­
tific" detachment and the concept of a 
single public interest associated with 
the comprehensive, rational model, in 
arguing for in effect a partisan and par­
tial approach favouring the disadvan­
taged. However, as De Neufville (1983: 
1) has argued, contenders to dethrone
the comprehensive style of planning
have attracted insufficient support to
supplant it.
In general the critics of both reigning 
champion and challengers have focus­
sed on three issues:- firstly, unreal ex­
pectations or focus, which leads to 
impotent proposals, secondly, the deli­
berate masking of value biases on the 
part of planners (and decision makers), 
particularly where planning has be­
come "the handmaiden of conservative 
politics" (Friedman, 1982), and thirdly 
an inability to accommodate the con­
flicting values of a pluralistic society: 
"for example, while proposing plan­
ners act as group advocates, the ad­
vocacy model provides no criteria for 
determining which groups are to be 
served or which . . .  conflicting in­
terests of groups members are to be 
promoted'.' (Klosterman, 1983:217) 
2.1 Emphasis on values and context 
In demanding that the values from 
which planning objectives are derived 
should be made explicit, planning the­
orists proceeded through a series of in­
creasingly explicit value-based formats, 
from advocacy planning, ' where the 
planner represents the (disadvantaged) 
clients in a plural combative political 
arena, to participatory and transactive 
planning, where the public are actively 
involved in determining value-related 
inputs such as objectives and priori­
ties, to structural modifications pri­
marily intended to serve the interests of 
the poor. 
Much of the criticism reflected the 
negative consequences of urban re­
newal, the urban and suburban conse­
quences of the capitalist social ethic, 
and the critical American climate of the 
late 60s regarding involvement in Viet­
nam, Black frustration over life and 
prospects in the metropolitan "ghet­
toes", and the emergence of the en­
vironmentalist "movement". The mi­
rage of a single public interest on which 
to base public planning and action 
evaporated in this increasingly divided, 
heterogenous society. 
The emergence, flowering and decline 
of this activism (1965-1977) was mat­
ched to a sequence of strategic styles. 
Open confrontation, characterised by 
marches, sit-ins and even riots, was 
succeeded by a more conciliatory ap­
proach, reflecting diminished Federal 
support for activism and environmen­
talism in particular and shifting public 
concerns as energy, inflation and unem­
ployment competed for the limelight 
(Susskind & Weinstein, 1980; Rivkin, 
1977:3). 
Having lost some political clout 
through this fragmentation of interest, 
opponents of change, of specific de­
velopment proposals, and of new tech­
nology separately or in combination 
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had to settle for what could be achieved 
through bargaining (Popper, 1985:28). 
Planned Unit Development, Barnett's 
style of Urban Design, and the Model 
Cities programmes provided examples 
of the utility of this approach in either 
areas of planning. 
As the 1970s ended, the idea of 
negotiating with the assistance of medi­
ator was introduced, or reintroduced, 
and developed, primarily for environ­
mental disputes. More recently it has 
spread to the broader urban planning 
field reflecting the social climate (Pop­
per, 1985; Fulton, 1985; Fleissig, 1983; 
Cormick & Patton, 1977 and Susskind 
and Ozawa, 1983). 
2.2 New planning values 
Over the last five years, Forester (1980 
and 1983), De Neufville (1983) and 
others have initiated the emergence of 
new planning approaches, which are 
characterized by an acceptance of con­
flicting values, uncertainty, and limited 
power to intervene, reflecting historic 
changes in the American and interna­
tional urban social context. 
Forester's 'rebounded rationality ' ar­
gument is a central element .in this 
search, and provides a framework for 
adjusting the planning approach to suit 
variations in the number of actors, the 
"muddiness of the decision-making 
waters", reliability of information, and 
antidpated co-operation between pub­
lic and other interested agencies (Fore­
ster, 1983:9-10). 
One of the purposes of this paper is to 
relate these concepts to the use of 
m·ediation given the apparent compata­
bility between its flexibility as a process, 
and Forester's strategies for pluralist 
or structurally distorted planning con­
texts. 
2.3 Relevance of the paradigm shift for 
South Africa. 
W here planning is regarded as a generic 
activity, independent of place, occasion 
and substantive content, local applica­
bility becomes irrelevant. However, this 
perspective has, as shown above, been 
criticised with increasing severity, and 
planning journals have published a 
growing number of articles dealing with 
planning in different cultural contexts: 
eg. Masser, Faludi et al., (1984), Dyck­
man et al., (1984). 
Some qualities of the local situation 
suggest the need to move from tradi­
tional notions of "rational" planning 
concerned primarily with efficiency 
and profit, towards a more open, medi­
atory stance. 
Bolan's (1964) classification of the cul­
tural dimensions relevant to planning 
will be used to support the conviction 
that our approach to planning should 
·change to close the gap between static
models of planning and our turbulent
social context. In his paper Bolan iden­
tifies four factors, namely process roles,
decision field characteristics, planning
and action strategies and issue attrib­
utes, as the significant dimensions.
2.3.1 Planning process roles have been
static for many years: given that the
legislative framework for planning in
the Transvaal, Free State and Natal has
not changed significantly since the
original planning ordinances were in­
troduced; and guide plans and structure
plans have produced even greater rigidi­
ty in what was already ar. inflexible,
zoning-oriented system, the planning
cast has comprised Township Board
officials, public planners (provincial
and local government) and private con­
sultants, playing before critics (lawyers)
and an audience ranging from apathetic
non-attendees to aggressive lobbyists
and mobs. It has been an all-White per­
formance, and the motivation has for
the most part been self interest -
whether profits, fees, publicity, or keep­
ing out of "trouble".
Where decision-making has been left to
an elite, whether the enfranchised
Whites here, or the planning commis­
sioners and politicians dependent on
big business in the USA, the results have
been similar - to protect the interests
of the powerful and wealthy, and 10 ig­
nore those of the poor and powerless.
As Boyer (1983: 18) describes: the agents
of change "sought not to relp those
condemned to seething tenem,ent cores
but to protect the rest of sodety from
the disorder that threatened to escape
from within the city perimeter". The
only difference of note in the Republic
was the relocation of the poor on the ur­
ban periphery not in central ghettoes.
2.3.2 The decision field was conse­
quently fragmented, partial (in both
senses), non-accountable to the disen­
franchised majority and only indirectly
responsible to the voter and the neigh­
bourhood/community group. The
governing party's hold over White poli­
tics was ;o powerful that only Afri­




and action strategies had 
a Victorian, paternalistic determinism: 
politicians in the governing body deter­
mined the focus of action, alone or 
jointly with provincial planners. Local 
autonomy at city or neighbourhood 
level has consistently been eroded, 
while resources are expended in the pur­
suit of first world norms in preference 
to third world necessities. 
The significant clients have been de­
velopers, the institutions corporate, and 
the consumers White. 
2.3.4 The dominant issues have as­
sumed a capitalistic ideology, with 
often uncharted benefits for a few, and 
uncompensated losses, for neighbours, 
neighbourhoods, and civic amenities! 
and perceptions. Actions have focussed 
on enabling private landowners to 
profit from intensified land use: public 
actions have been geared toward the 
reduction of entrepreneurial risk, on 
occasion in the past by direct transfer 
onto the shoulder of the ultimate pur­
chasers or occupants. For example de­
velopers were until fairly recently al­
lowed to develop land in floodplain:, or 
other suspect locations. 
In essence efficiency has always been 
promoted, frequently at the expense of 
equality of opportunity and just treat­
ment. Intangibles have succumbed to 
monetary concerns, because these pri­
orities were accepted by that sector of 
... the White electorate which participated 
in the process. 
2.3.5 Implications of the new turbulent 
political environment: however well the 
customary planning paradigms may 
have functioned in the past, significant 
changes witpin this cultural ambience 
would invalidate these procedures and 
techniques. If it can be shown that there 
is a st_rong likelihood that the context is 
changing, and will continue to do so at 
an increasing tempo, then the need for a 
new paradigm would appear obvious. 
The participants in, the traditional con­
text (governmental, developmental and 
local) represented three partially con: 
tradictory, but nevertheless overlapping 
value systems; this can hardly be 
claimed for the emerging situation: the 
collapse of Afrikaner unity and hegem­
ony, the slow emergence of a political 
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dispensation incorporating all four 
races, and at least three income classifi­
cations for each, further divided into 
conservative, moderate and radical ele­
ments, suggests as many as 36 potential 
viewpoints. South Africa is moving 
from a consensus-seeking towards a 
pluralistic, conflictual, decision­
making environment. In the process the 
poor and powerless are already acquir­
ing a powerful, combative voice. 
Not only are conventional processes 
and roles threatened, but where there 
was previously division in the decision 
field, this will be greatly multiplied in 
the near future; even the bastion of sta­
bility provided until recently by the 
volkspolitiek among Afrikaners, has 
been eroded - note the crystallization 
of three parties from the old nationalist 
party. New strategies .are therefore re­
quired to painstakingly build new coali­
tions and to achieve consensus through 
some or other compromises. 
The government appears to be edging 
towards a system of integrated but non­
accountable decision-making at region­
al level, and accountable, although spa­
tially (racially) segregated, local 
authorities. Whether or not this suc­
ceeds, or evolves into more responsible 
forms of government is somewhat im­
material at this point. What counts is 
the inexorable drift towards a pluralis­
tic, multicultural decision-making en­
vironment, which must drastically alter 
the foci, strategies, reallocation of 
resources, client relationships and 
deciding institutions. 
Ideological differences, such as recently 
occurred between the three legislative 
Houses in Cape Town, may become 
more wide-spread, and will have to be 
negotiated, since repression is, hopeful­
ly, not considered as an option. As peo­
ple obtain greater freedom to decide for 
themselves, these ideological stresses 
must filter down to all decision making 
levels. 
This brief assessment has attempted to 
articulate not only the need for change, 
but stirrings m the political context 
which upon maturation will inevitably 
demand consequential, parallel modifi­
cations in the planning approach. That 
American planning experienced such a 
period of rapid change, and the de­
velopment of new procedural styles in 
the 1960s was in no way coincidental; it 
simply reflected the social and institu­
tional turbulence of the time. 
3. THE PROPOSED MEDIATION 
MODEL 
Even conservative bodies like the 
ATKV* now concede the changes antic-
ipated above are likely to occur; conse-
quently negotiation and mediation 
represent virtually mandatory tech-
niques in the long haul as concensus is 
painfully crafted. In support of this 
contention, their nature as techniques, 
and experiences in their application.will 
now be assessed. 
3.1 Mediation and negotiation 
Negotiation is defined as a process of 
conferring, discussing or bargaining to 
reach agreement (Webster's Diction-
ary). By contrast, mediation as an ace 
tivity involves being in the position of 
an intermediary, seeking reconciliation 
through friendly or diplomatic inter-
vention, by consent or invitation, so as 
to settle differences between persons, 
institutions, groups or even nations. 
Negotiation involves only the principal 
actors, (Susskind & Weinstein, 1980: 
314) in head-on bargaining, as in labour 
disputes, where both parties recognize a 
common interest, despite their attempts 
to maximise their own benefits at the 
expense of their opponents through the 
bargaining process. 
Mediation, through the involvement of 
an apparently neutral third party, seeks 
a consensus agreement through a form 
of bargaining which frequently involves 
actors indirectly with one another. 
Thus negotiation, itself, has a tendency 
towards achieving sub-optimal results, 
whereas mediation is intended to op-
timize the net benefit enjoyed by all par-
ticipating actors and agencies. In the 
confrontational environment within 
which planners can expect to operate in 
the near future, mediation would there-
fore appear to offer better prospects for 
resolving conflicts over the apportion-
ment of resources associated with plan-
ning. 
3.2 Criteria for an ideal model 
Susskind & Weinstein (1980:346) re-
quire that an ideal model for mediation 
should possess the ability to rapidly dis-
cern 
(i) which factors are crucial to the dis-
pute 
(ii) which techniques work best in a 
given case 
(iii) and when a consensual approach is 
inappropriate. 
*Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuur Vereniging Con-
ference, August, 1986, as reported by the SABC. 
However, they admit these conditions 
have not beeri, and may never be, fully 
satisfied in the field of environmental 
disputes. Although the ideal may be un-
obtainable, it is however accepted that 
Susskind & Ozawa's (1984: 10-13) analy-
sis of international, labour, community 
dispute and environmental forms of 
mediation correctly identifies the latter 
as the most convincing model from 
which to derive a planning mediation 
process, on account of the appropriate-
ness of its qualities; 
"Environmental disputes are charac-
terized by substantial complexity, 
often heavy reliance on technical 
data and analysis, diffuse and un-
representable interests (su,ch as the 
interests of future generations), and 
substantial 'externalities'. Power rela-
tionships among interested parties 
tend to vary considerably, especially 
in terms of access to information, 
ability to manipulate the media and 
public opinion, and availability of 
resources to garner public support. 
The outcome of environmental dis-
putes can also have substantial impli-
cations for parties not represented in 
the negotiations, especially since 
such disputes involve what are, for all 
practical purposes, "irreversible" ef-
fects. The implementation of agree-
ments often presents formidable bb-
stacles when the cooperation of 
elected or appointed officials not in-
volved in the negotiations is neces-
sary. Finally, for the most part, en-
vironmental mediation is ad hoc, 
unlinked to formal processes of deci- " 
sion making. Thus, mediated settle-
ments require the stamp of approval 
of formal decision makers!' 
"The planner's role in developing al-
ternatives, identifying the implica-
tions of particular actions, and 
building an informed consensus ap-
pears closest to the role of the media-
tor in community and environmental 
disputes. Community and environ-
mental mediation stress the quality 
of the negotiated agreements and 
their implementability. Because of 
the relative unfamiliarity of the par-
ties with the negotiation process and, 
especially in environmental disputes, 
when technical analyses are essential, 
mediators in community and en-
vironmental disputes often serve as 
important sources of information. 
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The role of the mediator in these are-· 
nas thus more nearly parallels the 
role of the planner. 
"Moreover, just as the mediator must 
remain available to help untangle 
problems that arise during im-
plementation, so too, the planner 
ought to remain involved!' 
3.3 The concept 
Operationally, Cormick and Patton 
(1977) have defined mediation as "a 
voluntary process in which those in-
volved in a dispute jointly explore and 
reconcile their differences; the mediator 
has no authority to impose a settle-
ment. His or her strength lies in an abili-
ty to assist the parties in resolving their 
own differences. The mediated dispute 
is settled when the parties themselves 
reach what they consider to be a work-
able solution:• 
Fundamental details of this definition 
comprise 
- voluntary involvement of all parties; 
- joint exploration of the issues, 
although there may be supplemen-
tary caucusses to resolve issues not 
relevant to other actors; 
- the mediator's circumscribed role; 
- the solution is developed by/with all 
parties in a form acceptable to all; 
- the mediator shares the .responsibi-
lity of ensuring that the agreement 
represents a workable solution -
politically, physically and financial-
ly: this responsibility increases in in-
verse proportion to the skills of 
weaker parties to the dispute. (Cor-
mick and Patton, 1977: 14). 
3.4 Preconditions 
Several writers suggest at least eight 
preconditions for mediation - of these 
'Cormick and Patton (1977) identify 
four: firstly, issues must have been de-
fined; secondly, parties must be visible 
and highly involved, with a sense of ur-
gency, or as Susskind (1980) describes it 
"they must really want a solution". As 
long as any one party sees an advantage 
in delay there is little chance of real 
mediation. Thirdly, there must be a 
balance of power between parties. 
Fourthly, mediatidn will only succeed 
where there is a reasonable assurance 
that the participants will execute any 
agreement - Susskind and Weinstein 
(1980:323-335) prefer to see this spelled 
out in written form. 
Susskind and Weinstein add fifthly that 
a neutral, but concerned mediator, ex­
pert in dispute resolution is also essen­
tial, whilst Rivkin (1977) argues that 
mediation is a delicate process demand­
ing credibility and trust between par­
ticipants: this depend on sensitivity to 
others' points of view, acceptance that 
all interests are legitimate interests and 
on civility and toughness. 
A seventh requirement is that technical 
skills should be accessible, to permit 
rapid investigation of alternative op­
tions. Greenberg and Strauss (1977) 
suggest the use of computers for this 
purpose. 
Eighth, Carpenter and Kennedy (1977) 
argue that conflicts often arise from 
lack of information, or misinforma­
tion, and propose deliberate data­
sharing to reduce this problem. Green­
berg and Strauss (1977) stress the im­
portance of deciding which data is con­
tentious and which is acceptable to all 
parties, prior to debate based on the 
data. For land use planning and en­
vironmental disputes they suggest a 
four stage process for developing an 
accepted data base: 
(a) information packages on how to
estimate impacts;
(b) provision of consolidated base-line
data for all parties to use;
(c) programmed text with examples of
the application of (a) to (b);
(d) a computer programme for rapid
application of the process to diffe­
rent alternatives.
This process appears geared to what 
can be readily measured, quantified 
and manipulated, rather than to more 
contentious value biases. The greatest 
problems in relation to South African 
conditions could lie in achieving t!"!ese 
preconditions. 
3.5 The process 
Susskind and Weinstein (1980) are the 
most thorough exponents of a process 
suited to planning applications. Lake 
(1977) provides several additional pro­
cedural requirements, arguing that ir­
respective of the type of mediation ac­
tivity such as fact finding, dispute 
avoidance, conciliation or dispute reso­
lution, the process has a consistent pat­
tern - from the decision to mediate, to 
me9iator selection, timing of interven­
tion, selection of participants and tech­
nical experts, and implementation con­
siderations. 
Suss kind .and Weinstein formalise these 
activities in an eight step process geared 
to planning as follows: 
Step One 
Identify stakeholding parties to the dis­
pute. Shift the focus from the number 
of parties involved to the categories of 
interests that want and ought to partici­
pate, "to have all interests represented, 
but by as few people as possible, to sim­
plify negotiations" (Lake, 1977). 
Ensure the groups or interests that have 
a stake in the outcome are suitably 
represented by asking whether "spokes­
men" truly represent "their" consti­
tuency. Frequently the more powerful 
an interest, the harder it is to involve it. 
Lake also stresses that experts or profes­
sional advisers be restricted to an advi­
sory function, and do not serve as full 
participants. 
Step Two 
Narrow the agenda and confront fun­
damentally different values and as­
sumptions: sharpen vague preferences 
into specifics, and establish the magni­
tude of disagreements. Selective per­
ception of issues, based on emotional 
responses must be extended into a more 
holistic grasp. Frequently modifica­
tions of position occur as a result. 
Step Three 
Generate enough alternatives to cover 
all points of view: each perspective 
must find an alternative which it es­
pouses even if it is the do-nothing ver­
sion, before proceeding. 
Step Four 
Agree on boundaries and time horizons 
for the exercise. These choices can sig­
nificantly impact the assessment of 
costs/benefits deriving from the issue 
under consideration. 
Step Five 
Weight, scale and amalgamate cost/ 
benefit judgments. Here Susskind and 
Weinstein refer to the problems of data 
accuracy, and contentiousness (see 3.4. 
above). Philosophically, the problem of 
amalgamation deserves extremely tho­
rough investigation. The literature o� 
evaluation and environmental impact 
assessment is replete with discussion of 
the risks entailed: only use it if all par­
ties ·�articipate in, and achieve agree­
ment on; the weighting of elements. 
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Step Six 
Determine fair compensatory or miti­
gatory measures. Often non-monetary 
solutions are more apposite for some of 
the participants - e.g. an exchange of 
sites. 
In this respect the confidentiality of 
proceedings is vital (Lake, 1977:8), since 
"trial floats" often depend on th!! abili­
ty to gauge response before irrevocable 
commitment. 
Step Seven 
In implementing the agreement, "All 
parties should be made aware of the 
difficulties facing efforts to implement 
the solution(s) when they attemp·t to 
reach closure'.' Lake suggests the impor­
tance of having some polidcal sanction 
to back the agreement, while Clarke 
(1977) argues the need for a temporary 
body or commission to ensure imple­
mentation according to the agreement. 
Urilike the composition of many per­
manent institutions The Commission
must consist of representatives of all 
major shareholding groups. 
Step Eight 
Hold the parties to their commitments. 
Susskind and Weinstein supported in 
regard to contract zoning by Tremaine 
and Yates (1977) argue that a contract 
can serve this purpose. However, this 
requirement can introduce difficulties 
if not spelled out in initial discussions. 
Non-institutional parties, e.g. pressure 
groups, may lack a permanent identity, 
or split over the agreement. Supposed 
U!lavailability of funds has also been 
used to justify non-compliance with 
original conditions, once developers 
have achieved their aims in the first 
phase of complex schemes (Fulton, 
1985:9). This is more likely in the USA 
where litigation is more common, and 
accessible than, in the Republic. 
3.6 The role and qualifications of 
the mediator 
Susskind and Weinstein (1980:347) and 
Susskind and Ozawa (1983) summarise 
the mediator's roles: agenda clai:ifica­
tion, scheduling of meetings, stating the 
ground rules clearly, moderating dis­
cussion, encouraging participants to 
"hang in" there till a solution is found, 
maintaining a sense of the mutual in­
terest of all in finding a solution, assess­
ing the motives of different parties (and 
controlling histrionics), extracting hid-
den agendas, and identifying issues, 
trading off potentials and information 
gaps. Qualifications for this role in­
clude impartiality, independence, a 
flexible mind, an ability to encourage 
openness, and humour. Adequate train­
ing in group dynamics, and knowledge 




4.1. Published evaluations 
The advantages and �isadvantages of 
this approach have been described as 
follows in the literature. 
4.1.1 Advantages 
There are three primary advantages of 
mediation: benefits accruing through 
the participatory nature of mediation, 
benefits related to more efficient 
problem resolution, and benefits accru­
ing to the overall "social climate''. The 
arguments for user participation have 
been discussed at length elsewhere by 
Faludi (1973), Goodman (1972), and 
others; and Davidoffs notion of ad­
vocacy planning relied on the idea that 
all points of view should be represented, 
even if not by interested parties in per­
son. More recently some radical plan­
ning theorists have changed their 
ground, arguing that by ensuring wor­
ker participation in "local govern­
ment" the authorities will be coerced 
into a more active role in protecting 
neighbourhoods (Fainstein and Fain­
stein, 1982). 
Efficiency is served better thrnugh 
mediation than litigation since delays 
and costs are reduced, and results im­
prove (Susskind and Weinstein, 1980: 
314). Delays diminished when issues 
could bypass the clogged American le­
gal system, proportionally reducing 
costs. Better results are attributable to 
(a) a broader involvement of interested
parties. For example judges tend to
focus issues narrowly to simplify the
case, whereas most planning and
environmental issues are inherently
complex and polycentric (Susskind
and Weinstein, 1980).
(b} the use of mediators who are 
familiar with the field and its issues, 
unlike judges, who are untrained in 
scientific or technical considera­
tions relevant to many environmen­
tal and planning problems. 
Lake (1977:7) adds that this method is 
more accessible to those who cannot 
afford legal representation. Clarke 
(1977: 11) believes that mediation can be 
used to reform and improve existing 
procedures. Cormick and Patton (1977) 
identify procedural flexibility as a 
major plus in terms of the number of 
actors, type of tradeoffs, treatment of 
issues - since the process can be 
tailored to suit circumstances. 
Susskind and Weinstein (1980:353) add 
that public agencies benefit from quick­
er achievement of consensus and par­
ticipation, improving the overall social 
climate within which they must operate, 
by avoiding the residue o� bitterness 
and suspicion normally attendant on 
confrontation: note also fn this regard 
Susskind and Ozawa (1983:5). In the 
local context where bitterness has be­
come so deep rooted this is one way of 
overcoming it and avoiding further ex­
acerbation of the problem. 
4.1.2 · Disadvantages 
Disadvantages also revolve around 
three sets of issues: perils inherent in the 
approach, implementation difficulties, 
and characteristics associated with 
planning and environmental questions. 
Rivkin (1977) identified the "perils" 
as including the high cost of mediation, 
much of which has to be financed1prior 
to the developments from which the 
funds would be expected to come, 
and the difficulty of finding a good 
mediator. 
Susskind and Weinstein (1980:352-3) 
mention the unwillingness of large 
agencies to involve themselves in medi­
ation as a problem, citing three causes: 
The agency may be accused of exceed­
ing its powers, it may not wish to offend 
elected officials, or may resist its more 
limited role in a mediated process as 
one equal participant among many. 
4.2 Case studies 
Having reviewed mediation characteris­
tics identified in the literature, the case 
studies provide an opportunity to assess 
the accuracy of the model, admittedly 
within the limits of secondary sources. 
A range of subject areas were selected to 
permit more thorough assessment: 
coverage includes large scale, ·regional 
studies through two levels of urban 
planning - local and metropolitan, to 
the question of public utility planning. 
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4.2.1 Regional development 
4.2.1.1 Pine Barrens 
Goldstein (1981) observed the different 
cycles of political activity between 1960 
and 1980 in the eastern part of New Jer­
sey known as the Pine Barrens (Fig. 1). 
Successively, this natural region was 
threatened by a proposed Port of New 
York Authority Jetport, then by in­
cremental exurban residential complex­
es and new communities. 
Consequently the process may be 
viewed over time as a sequential de­
velopment of public resistance to de­
velopment. The Jetport controversy 
prepared the ground for later interven­
tion by fluid citizen groupings using 
varied tactics. The case cannot be 
termed a pure mediation exercise but is 
worth including for the insights it pro­
vides into public bargaining, in the ab­
sence of suitable institutional frame­
works, spawning a set of political 
institutions for negotiating out such 
issues. 
The original search for a new Airport 
site involved "casual arrogance" in the 
Port of New York Authority's approach, 
and strong opposition from the upper 
income suburbs, characterizing "two 
value systems on a collision course": 
ever expanding economic growth vs. 
new middle and upper ·income classes 
politically and financially capable of 
protecting their social environment" 
(Goldstein, 1981 :66-81). 
Over time the Jetport site issue was bat­
tled by a range of communities, as the 
authorities shifted their proposals in 
the face of vociferous opposition. Ulti­
mately the site was transferred to the 
Pine Barrens area (Fig. 2) a fallback 
option to avoid this powerful _political 
opposition. Whilst the major interests 
which could have been expected to sup­
port the proposal - the Airlines and 
the US Air Force - displayed little in­
terest in this proposal, Goldstein (1981: 
72-73), the opposition also coalesced 
slowly from "a loosely built association 
of lifelong conservationists" (p. 71), 
who almost inadvertently introduced 
the issue into th� 1969 gubernatorial 
race (p. 77). As the threat was perceived 
and publicised, opposition grew from 
those who stood to lose most. Later 
these groups re-organized themselves to 
deal with conflicts between water de­
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growers, to decide control of large water 
resources and aquifers. 
In the environmentally conscious cli­
mate of the 1970s new planning agen­
cies emerged, forcing citizen groups to 
restructure their approach (Goldstein, 
1981), since to resist a permanent threat 
required permanent organizations. 
These used the new governmental agen­
cies to combat each other as follows: 
• "Local control" and "free enter­
prise" believers used more vulner­
able locally based planning agencies
established with the State Govern­
ment's aid,
• The environmentalists sought to in­
volve the powerful state and Federal
Agencies as "coplanners" of the
region.
The rationality of these tactics is hard to 
explain, since the stated aims have little 
to do with rationality or overt concerns, 
Goldstein (1981: 100). However, she 
noted that Canadians, unlike the New 
Jerseyans, following British legal tradi­
tion were unable to effectively voice 
their concerns, because they could not 
gain direct access to the bargaining 
within the decision making process. 
4.2.1.2 The western resource lands 
Quoting the cases of mining in Idaho, 
Utah and Wyoming, and the Washing­
ton/Oregon Forestry Industry cases, 
Kartez (1983). described certain unique 
features of land resource conflicts 
which separate them from other types 
of conflicts; 
- the decision-making is decentra­
lised;
- the local managers live in the com­
munities which are affected by their
decisions, establishing a mutual de­
pendency, which influences the per­
ceptions of both sides.
Consequently, he argues that where 
natural/mineral resources are con­
cerned, the conventional perception of 
big business and the public interest as 
inevitably in opposition, does not hold. 
Citing an agreement negotiated in 
Idaho (1982) to reinstate the Clean Air 
Act, and the experiences of the Wash­
ington Forestry Resources Association, 
Kartez (1983/4) found mediation was 
timely and provided continuous com­
munication, ameliorating the obscurity 
of the public policy maze and the inflex­
ibility of federal programme rigidities. 
Nevertheless, he expressed reservations 
about the feasibility of using mediation 
for everyday environmental dispute 
resolution, citing a shortage of suffi­
ciently trained mediators, and the high 
costs currently associated with this 
method. 
4.2.2 Negotiated Investment Strategies 
(N.I.S.) 
These have been applied under substan­
tially different circumstances with 
varied aims. 
4.2.2.t The Columbus Negotiated 
Investment Strategy (NJ.S.) 
This entailed protracted mediation 
ranging from site specific land use mat­
ters to metropolitan scale social poli­
cies. 
Suss kind was OQe of the two mediators, 
so the process followed tlie principles he 
enunciates. It began with decisions on 
ground rules, (membership, proceed­
ings, records, media control and the 
relationship between the N.l.S. and 
other government action), and con­
tinued with written problem state­
ments, and finally a series of structured 
discussions (between December 1979 
and March 1980). Final reports from 
eight three party subcommittees had 
been debated, discussed and agreed on 
by the end of April, seven months after 
the process commenced. 
By 1982, 60% of the agreement had 
been realised. This can be attributed to 
the careful crafting of the agreement 
and the thoroughness with which the 
implementation was spelled out: 
- projects were priced and itemized;
- policy changes specified;
- procedures for implementation were
stated, responsibilities assigned for
monitoring items, and provision
made for resolving conflicting
agreements.
Overall this N.l.S. must be considered a 
success. 
4.2.2.2 The Malden, Mass. (N.I.S.) 
This decaying Boston suburb used 
N.l.S. (and Susskind) to persuade
major stakeholders to participate in
planning the city's future. Government,
citizens and business teams met and
negotiated a 148 recommendation
agenda, explicating agreement on long­
term goals. Using mediation to sharpen
goals - "eliminates grandstanding and
irrelevant detail" (Woodhams, 1985) -
there is a greater commitment than
usual to realizing the plan.
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A demoralised community made going 
heavy, but eventually recommendations 
were developed in each of six areas: 
• public education,
• economic development,
• city pride and beautification,
• public safety,
• human services and
• city finance.
Despite public scepticism the easiest 
proposal namely to beautify the town had 
already been completed by June, 1984. 
Procedurally also, Susskind's criteria 
seemed to have been successful, despite a 
participating group of 47 viewpoints. 
Reservations were expressed about 
implementation where decisions are agreed 
to by loosely established groups since, unlike 
corporations or public agencies, they are 
relatively impermanent. 
The mayor understood this, but continuous 
public surveillance was essential to ensure 
the agreement was fulfilled. The city plan­
ner was convinced, however, that the experi­
ment had succeeded (Woodhams, 1985:75). 
4.2.3 Public utilities 
Two examples will be discussed briefly, since 
the original source material in Susskind and 
Ozawa (1984) is limited. However, it 
nevertheless still indicates the feasibility of 
mediation in this context. 
4.2.3.1 Brayton Point Coal Conversion 
This was one of several New England power 
supply utilities which attracted controversy 
when conversion from oil to coal fired tech­
nology was mooted (1977). Several months 
of careful analysis preceded formal sessions, 
and after eleven months all was signed and 
sealed. Insofar as it was described, O'Con­
nor's method was similar to Susskind's and 
insights gained during the process were used 
to develop "pivotal suggestions". Criticism 
focussed on the neglect of some public in­
terests. 
4.2.3.2 Foothills water treatment 
project 
This was planned 25 miles SW. of Denver (in 
1977), and generated a stalemate between 
federal and local agencies, and environmen­
tal groups. Eventually, despite his stated 
support for one po�ition and his power as a 
congressman to bring pressure to bear on 
various parties, Congressman Wirth was co­
opted to mediate the discussions. 
Wirth began by privately consulting 
senior officials in the principal agen­
cies, the Army Corps of Engineers, 
Environmental Protection Agency, and 
the Denver Water Board, following this 
with rounds of mediated negotiations, 
which hinged on a report by the Corps 
of Engineers on all major issues in the 
controversy. With only minor .changes 
following its circulation, ths report 
became the basis of the agreement: it 
was seen as a mixed bag since all gained 
something, but conceded part of their 
agenda in exchange. Failure resulted, 
however, because not all of the stake­
holders in the dispute were incorporat­
ed in the discussions, and one environ­
mental faction turned to litigation. This 
may have reflected Wirth's own percep­
tions and biases in defining significant 
interests. The longterm prospects for 
water supply to the region were conse­
quently compromised. 
4.2.4 Public interest in an urban 
setting: Denver and Santa Monica 
In both these cases, despite the different 
ideological persuasions of the partici­
pants, the issues revolve around inner 
city development and redevelopment. 
4.2.4.1 Denver CBD 
In the case of Denver the focus was on 
the development of a model of Urban 
Design (Appleyard, 1982: 122), with an 
emphasis on growth and real estate con­
cerns, whilst the Santa Monica expe­
rience entailed a "progressive" move­
ment. These cases therefore represented 
opposite poles of the political spec­
trum. 
Fleissig (1983a: 12) supports the prin­
ciple of public/private central city deve­
lopment partnerships, arguing a shift 
towards this form of government -
investor-resident collaboration repre­
sents a three way set of influences: 
• Political realities: The 80s reflect in­
creased competition f01 public
money, since basic city service� and
human services, education, welfare
and social security are likely to
dominate the budgets;
• Economic reality: Costs and risks of
financing real estate tend to favour
larger developers and institutions
rather than the small or medium
scale.
• Design realities: Zoning, building
and energy regulations constrain the
project designs, combining with fi­
nancial impositions to leave little de­
sign leeway. In this constricted en­
vironment Fleissig (1983a) argues
"no qne actor in the development 
business can go it alone". He is im­
plicitly asking for a negotiative 
stance from all three parties: 
"In short, quality downtown de­
velopment will succeed when citizen 
suggestions and concerns exert a 
driving force rather than remaining 
in a reactive position: when corpora­
tions feel a personal stake in improv­
ing their Work environment, rather 
than hoping somebody else will take 
care of it, and when city govern­
ments act to protect their invest­
ments downtown so as not to lose 
business and residents to outlying 
areas:' These actions can take place 
only if the actors work together in a 
truly collaborative process. This is 
what makes private/public partner­
ships different from past program­
mes. Developers, city off icials busi­
ness leaders and n�ighbourhood 
leaders will be forced to work toge­
ther in order for any major project 
to be built. 
In a subsequent article on Denver's 
thirteen block Mall, Fleissig (1983b) 
describes how the Denver partner­
ship, a non-profit, private organiza­
tion of business, civic, educatio(lal 
and community groups successfully 
intervened in developing new zoning 
controls for the Mall. Whilst not 
specifically identified as a negotiat­
ed solution, the existence of a range 
of actors who hammered out an 
agreement in a process which in­
volved "all the participants from the 
beginning", closely approximates 
the mediation process. This oc­
curred despite indifference and op­
position from the Director of the 
City Planning Department. 
Using consensus, as in mediation, 
the proposals were submitted to, and 
approved by the city council within 
six months of the commencement of 
the exercise. 
The lessons learnt coincide with 
many characteristics of mediation, 
such as the importance of a clear, 
comprehensive / agenda, and the 
value of having a range of alterna­
tives available for discussion at all 
sessions. 
4.2.4.2 Santa Monica 
Here a populist group was elected in 
I ' 
' 1981 on a platform placing residents 
needs ahead of business and real estate 
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interests {Shearer, 1982; Fulton, 1985). 
Without extensive discussion the cen­
tral issue was whether to prevent de­
velopers from exploiting Santa Moni­
ca's central position in Los Angeles, 
to the detriment of a large local rental 
community. The citizens elected a 
group whose policies included, inter 
alia: 
(i) encouraging affordable housing by 
making it a non-negotiable de­
mand facing all commercial de­
velopers;
(ii) controlling housing rentals and
preventing further conversion of
apartment blocks into condomi­
niums;
(iii) empowering local neighbourhoods
to substantially determine their
own future, and
(iv) utility rate surveillance.
Whilst the populists operated as an 
elected council, the "city's wide-open 
political atmosphere" permitted them 
to test developer exactions, tenant 
ownership cooperatives and other inno­
vations. Hence the significance for 
mediation/negotiation: "for 3 1/2 years 
while they prepared new development 
guidelines the ruling group used open­
ended zoning negotiations to extract 
promises from ... developers ... wrest­
ing low income housing, money for so­
cial services" and other concessions 
from them. A former planning com­
missioner, Frank Hotchkiss, stressed 
the centrality of political concerns in 
their conception of land use develop­
ment, rather than mechanistic ques­
tions of economic efficiency (Fulton, 
1985:5-6). 
Certain features deserve comment: 
(a) In the interim, while developing new
land use controls, the negotiating
process enabled the council to avoi.d
delay in implementing its radical
policy, and gain experience in its
implementation.
(b) Case-by-case negotiation of rights
was problematic, exhausting and ex­
pensive, persuading official negoti­
ators it was only acceptable on an
interim basis.
(c) The importance of establishing who
could participate in negotiations
was not initially appreciated, pro­
ducing considerable confusion on
occasion.
(d) Encouraging vociferous neighbour­
hood group participation was over-
ly successful, creating hyper aggres­
sive community groups who some­
times rounded on their Council 
"mentors". 
(e) Since the adoption of the revised
land use controls the development
agreement procedure has been re­
served for phased, or large, complex 
projects. 
5. CONCWSIONS
5.1 The need to change 
This paper has argued the need for 
adaptations to the prevailing planning 
paradigm which will render procedures 
better able to cope with emerging politi­
cal and social demands in South Africa. 
Primarily, the question of divided in­
terests and differential public values 
demands a less technocratic and more 
socially responsive and complex style of 
planning. Forester (1983) summarises 
this in his arguments for the planning 
approach to recognise the implications 
of working in a confused, obscure con­
text where rationality is limited or 
bounded in its applicability. 
It was further argued that in terms of 
Bolan's cultural dimensions of plan­
ning, South African planning practice 
was no longer appropriate in a context 
of turbulent change - the process 
roles, decision field elements, planning 
and action strategies, and dominant is­
sues requiring to be re-assessed. Conse­
quently mediation, rather than negotia­
tion, might be of use in revised planning 
environment. 
5.2 Generic model evaluation 
In order to analyse mediation's poten­
tial, a particular model was developed 
and described procedurally and relative 
to operational preconditions. 
(i) This model has been tested against
a number of case studies, with the
following conclusions: The matrix
(Figure 2) shows that, in relating
the case studies to criteria based on
the mediation model discussed
above (see 3.1-3.4), only three
criteria did not apply in at least
6211/o of the case studies, and those
three were still present in 5011/o of
the cases. Half the criteria had a
7511/o rating or better. Since the
cases were selected to present a
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flicts . over environmental quality 
and development had to be; recon­
ciled, rather than deliberately seek­
ing examples of mediation, this 
suggests that the model has wide­
spread applicability. Furthermore 
the matrix has not expressly ex­
plored the mqre detailed procedu­
ral aspects, since the information 
was not available; if it had been 
there might have been reduced 
agreement between the model and 
the cases. 
(ii) In some of the case studies not all
parties were included in initial de­
bates. As with scoping in the ad­
ministration of EIA's in the United
· States, the fundamental importance
of reaching agreement on what to
consider and · how to treat it
(Schneider and Tohm, 1985), was
stressed by the failures associated
with such incomplete participa­
tion.
(iii) the cases also underline the impor­
tance of ensuring that specific pro�
visions for implementation are in­
cluded as part of the deal. In the
cases of Columbus, the Western
resource lands, Malden and Bray­
ton this was a major contributor to
early and successful implementa­
tion. The Foothills exercise, and the
efforts of the Santa Monica Pro­
gressivists to permit a proposed
$150 million dollar hotel-office­
retail complex only on condition
social criteria were satisfied (Ful­
ton, 1985:7), both foundered, be­
cause the execution of the agree­
ment had not been adequately
safeguarded.
(iv) Mediation does not depend on
coercion; it is voluntary and de­
pends on the commitment of the
interested parties to succeed:
"Mediation is a voluntary process.
The mediator has no authority to
impose a settlement. The mediated
dispute is settled when the parties
themselves reach what they con­
sider to be a workable solution"
(Susskind and Weinstein,
1980:314).
(v) The primary function of media­
tion appears to lie in determining
the scope of the policies or projects
being negotiated - in converting
broad goals, hidden agendas, and
personal or group preferences into
a set of objectives, constraints and
criteria for .accommodating them. 
However, the emphasis· on imple­
mentation also requires that in­
terested parties be satisfied with 
the package which emerges, and be 
prepared to see it through to com-
pletion. 
5.3 Specific application in So�th Africa 
In recognition of the unfamiliar so­
ciopolitical conditions likely to be ex­
perienced in the near future, new plan­
ning approaches will . be needed. The 
body of the preceding material has been 
provided to support the argument that 
media(ion, based. on the environmental 
medi.ation precedent and characteris­
tics, has much to qffer planning. 
Whether it can be applied in South 
Africa depends on the answers to three 
questions. Can the preconditions for its 
use be satisfied? Would it represent a 
better or more appropriate means of 
arriving at decisions? ls it culturally 
feasible - are there signs that medias 
tion · is compatible with existing deci­
sion making processes? 
5.3.1 Preconditions 
Here the three crucial issues would ap-
pear to be whether a climate of credibil­
ity and trust can be created in. the 
deliberations, whether the imbalances 
of power are insurmountable, and 
whether neutral mediators can be 
found. 
To create a climate of trust and a will­
ingness to hear opposing viewpoints 
will be difficult. However, the Indaba 
between Kwazulu and Natal, and the 
Nkomati Accord suggest it is possible. 
Forester (1983) argues that power is not 
evenly, but unequally distributed, and 
the planner should attempt to balance 
this by the aid he provides for the voices 
of the powerless and underprivileged to 
be h.eard. Simply to be present during 
deli6erations may affect the results, but 
like a sop, it is not permanently satisfy­
ing. To participate fully, however, re­
quires adequate resources, time off to 
attend, professional advisers and con­
fidence that one's opinion will be 
respected. These requirements ought to 
be incorporated into the mediatory 
package, to balance the inequalities 
power creates. 
Forester presses this point further (p. 14) 
by feferring to the ubiquitous, un­
predictable patterns assumed by con-
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flict under ·such circumstances. Where 
such uncertainty reigns, standardised 
measures, whether for facility provision 
or design, become not only meaningless 
but also obstructions to workable solu­
tions. Planning in the Republic has used 
standards as crutches, :as substitutes for 
carefully considering genuine rather 
than abstract needs. 
The neutral mediator is provided by 
training and experience. It ·would there­
fore be possible to have the first group 
specially trained - abroad if necessary 
- before employing them to dissemi­
nate their skills.
Defining the issues and identifying 
points of view seem less difficult to 
achieve, provided the · importance of 
these activities is acknowledged. Ex­
ecutingthe agreements could be accom­
modated by the use of contracts, while 
the availability of technical skills and 
data'will depend.on each case's merits. 
If the finances are provided these re­
quirements can easily be met. 
5.3.2 Better decisions 
Benefits in participation and an im­
proved · social climate would probably 
exceed their equivalent in the USA, 
while efficiency would be measured in 
terms of the consequences of greater 
social stability rather than simple 
timesaving. 
Of the problems listed, the most severe 
is likely to be intransigence on the part 
of larger agencies - governmental and 
corporate. Some confrontations may 
well have to occur before the value of 
cooperation is accepted. Conflict of in­
terest is unavoidable in this pluralistic 
environment, and cannot be overcome 
by decree - unless one depends on 
naked force. Consequently planning in 
South Africa will inevitably cease to 
occur within a comprehensive national 
framework, and will instead become 
lodged in Forester 's bounded planning 
environment. Instead of clearly de­
fined, rationally treated problems, 
where information is unquestioned and 
time unlimited, planners will be faced 
with problems which are somewhat am­
biguous in scope and evaluation, infor­
mation is incomplete, and time is limit­
ed, or worse still, the problems are 
pluralistic, if not structurally distorted 
(Forester, 1983:8-16). Here the agents 
and actors are competitive, and uneven­
ly. equipped, located in different places 
and power centres, the problems are 
multiple and defined through personal 
or ideological value bases, information 
is contested, withheld and manipulated 
more or less overtly, and time is a joker 
in the hands of the powerful. The result 
is (Forester, 1983: 14): "in the face of 
pluralist competition and conflict, bar­
gaining and adjustment are necessary 
.. :• "'mutual partisan adjustment' be­
comes a practical incremental strategy, 
(if not the only alternative to rank op­
pression)", and becomes all the more 
defensible if there are indeed 'watch­
dogs' for all affected interests. 
A major objective of effective planning 
will have to become the construction of 
consensus. If conflict of interest be­
comes endemic, the only alternative to 
social disruption and civil strife will be 
the crafting of temporary coalitions, 
creating points of equilibrium for long 
enough to enact changes and lay the 
foundations of a new order, in which all 
citizens stand to lose something should 
it fail. 
Furthermore, if the current distribution 
of resources is unfair, then steps to 
remedy this can begin with a system of 
negotiation in which all parties are 
represented, not just the most powerful 
- in other words the environmental
style of mediation, not that of labour
negotiation.
5.3.3 Cultural feasibility 
Finally, there is the question of cultural 
continuity. Forester admits that the cir­
cumstances or context dictate what ac­
tions will appear sensible. As identified 
above (2.l) there is growing recognition 
that different cultures distribute power 
in peculiar ways, that checks and 
balances vary, as do perceptions of 
values such as honesty, freedom and 
justice. 
South African governance is rooted in 
an amalgam of Dutch, French, tribal 
and British colonial, political and ad­
ministrative structures. By and large, 
power and decision making is not as 
open in these as in the American ethos, 
and paternalism and autocratic/bu­
reaucratic traits dominate .. 
However, the, advantage of building 
from environmental mediation founda­
tions lies in the local experience and in­
stitutions which have already emerged. 
For example, the Council for the En­
vironment consists of representatives of 
Government and of many private as­
sociations and professional bodies; it 
has emerged through sustained pressure 
from professionals of the public for 
change; it began as an advisory body, 
and has acquired official status even to 
the point of recommending legal 
changes. The step from it to mediation 
is not that large. 
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Much of the argument for mediation, 
and to which it must provide solutions 
and compromises, derives from differ­
ences of value and interpretation. The 
comfortable world of the technician 
projecting demands, based on a set of 
standards chosen either from personal 
preference, arbitrary whim or tradition­
al dogma, is an anachronism. 
It is disappearing in the first world, and 
can no longer be justified here: we must 
replace numerical abstractions derived 
from nineteenth century British prac­
tice with a willingness to accept that 
most people krJow, or can be helped to 
decide, what they need and the order of 
priority of these needs. 
Attempts to mislead or coerce the af­
fected population inevitably produce 
resistance and strife. It is far easier, and 
less expensive in the long run, to discuss 
with people the issues of concern, and 
the gist of the more likely or preferred 
alternatives·available to solve them, and 
then forge a concensus through debate, 
than it is to impose a solution on a 
recalcitrant, hostile community, united 
by their dislike for what is being foisted 
on them. If planners would put them­
selves in the place of the planned-upon, 
they would surely realise this. For plan­
ners to assume a mediatory role will 
also be more rewarding and .satisfying, 
as well as more effective in building a 
better South Africa. 
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